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 This major paper explores observed trends in residential urban infill and intensification and the need 
for improved affordability in this type of development.  Following detailed analysis of the affordability crisis 
within the City of Toronto, it is determined that strategies for improving the affordability of housing must be 
identified.  Public-private partnerships are explored as a way to overcome the financial challenges that are 
preventing the construction of affordable rental housing.  Through analysis of the City of Toronto’s 
partnership program (Let’s Build), this paper concludes that as long as senior government support for 
housing remains low, the use of intergovernmental and public-private partnerships will be the most realistic 




Part One: Infill and the Affordability Crisis 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 In recent years, there has been growing interest in the role of infill development in implementing 
growth management strategies, such as smart growth.  Infill development is simply a market response to 
rising land value which involves the development of vacant sites or intensified use of underutilized sites within 
existing urban areas.  It has been identified as a way to “accommodate development, much of it incremental 
and small-scale, on undeveloped building lots or in areas that have been abandoned or are currently 
underutilized” (Beatley and Manning 1997, 53).  Infill developments vary considerably because the physical 
outcome of each project is determined by site-specific design objectives and challenges.  Some projects will 
involve adaptive reuse of historic buildings or construction of additional floors on existing buildings, while 
others will require that new buildings be constructed.  Infill development is made possible by the fact that 
most cities have vacant parcels of land and underutilized sites, such as surface parking lots and low density 
commercial or institutional buildings.  While infill development will not entirely replace the need for exurban 
and peripheral growth, it is argued that a significant amount of future growth could be accommodated within 
existing urban areas through intensification practices (Gladki et al 2002; Haughey 2001; Daly and Milgrom 
1998; Suchman and Sowell 1997; Beatley and Manning 1997; Isin 1991). 
 This major paper was initiated in response to observations that while infill development in the City of 
Toronto is commendable for contributing to the development of a more compact urban form, it fails to meet 
the needs of low- and moderate-income households.  This is because the majority of infill development 
within the City of Toronto is in the freehold and condominium ownership markets, with as little as 0 to 3 
percent in rental unit production in recent years (ONPHA 1999, 86).  To understand the negative impact of 
this tenure ratio on low- and moderate-income households, consider that the average unit selling price of all 
newly completed single detached and semi-detached dwellings in Toronto in 2001 was $336,173 (CMHC 
2001a).  Figures published by the Toronto Real Estate Board indicate that the average condominium selling 
price in central Toronto in December 2002 was $272,634 (TREB 2003, data for all condominium sizes, 
including new and old units).  Prices in this range would command a household income of approximately 
$77,431/year and a $33,617 (ten percent) down payment for a single or semi-detached house, and 
approximately $62,796/year and a $27,263 down payment for a condominium (assuming a 25 year 
amortization period on the mortgage).  In fact, the required income for a condominium would actually be 
higher because this calculation does not include condominium fees, which can add significantly to annual 
expenses.  Considering that the median annual household income in the City of Toronto was $40,400 in 
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1996, housing in this range cannot be considered affordable to a large percent of households within the City 
of Toronto (Statistics Canada 1996, quoted in OMMAH 2002).   
 Meanwhile, a severe shortage in the supply of affordable rental units - caused by dramatic 
reductions in both private and assisted rental housing completions since the early 1990s and the ongoing 
loss of existing units to demolitions and condominium conversions - has driven Toronto’s average rent 
beyond the means of low-income households.  The average rent for a three bedroom apartment in the City of 
Toronto rose from $782/month in 1989 (ONPHA 1999, 84) to $1,212/month in 2001 (CMHC 2001b), which is 
not affordable to a large percent of tenant households within the City of Toronto.  Moreover, it has been 
determined that average rents are rising faster than the rate of inflation (HSWG 2001; FCM 2000) and that 
this rise in rent coincides with a period of overall decline in tenant incomes (ONPHA 1999).  Average family 
income in the city dropped by 12.5 percent between 1991 and 1996 (City of Toronto 1999, 135), which has 
caused a notable increase in the incidence and depth of poverty in Toronto.  According to Statistics Canada, 
the incidence of low-income among the population living in private households in Toronto rose from 15 
percent in 1990 to 21.1 percent in 1995 (Statistics Canada 1996a).  These figures confirm my initial 
observation that Toronto’s infill development is catering to high-income households while low- and moderate-
income households are being priced out of the city. 
 
1.2 Why Toronto Needs Affordable Infill 
 The exclusivity of infill development is a significant problem because infill sites represent a valuable 
opportunity to increase the supply of low-cost units where the demand is most acute.  When infill 
development only provides luxury condominiums and townhouses for the high-end of the market, this 
opportunity is wasted.  To explain, in terms of the distribution of demand for low-cost housing, regional 
analysis indicates that the City of Toronto has a far greater proportion of low-income households than the 
rest of the Greater Toronto Area municipalities (City of Toronto 1999; ONPHA 1999).  Therefore, it is logical 
that the amount of low-cost housing available in Toronto should correspond to this aspect of the population.  
However, this is not the case.  Toronto’s housing stock is unbalanced in two ways.  First, there is not 
enough affordable housing, as indicated by the large number of households paying more than they can afford 
for their housing.  Affordability is determined by the percentage of household income that is spent on basic 
housing costs, such as rent or mortgage payments and utilities.  In 1999, at least 45 percent of tenant 
households within the City of Toronto were spending more than 30 percent of gross household income on 
rent (City of Toronto 1999, 137).  The threshold of 30 percent of gross household income is the most widely 
recognized housing affordability standard and as such will be used as the standard in this report.  
Households that must spend more than 30 percent on rent are considered to be experiencing an affordability 
crisis.  According to the Mayor’s Homelessness Action Task Force (City of Toronto 1999, 137),  
 
 “30 percent of income is an established norm for the percentage of gross income that low- 
and moderate-income households can afford to spend on shelter while leaving enough over 
for taxes, food, clothing, transportation, and other necessities.  It is the main criterion for 
CMHC’s Core Need approach to housing need and has been used in international 
comparisons.”   
 
In addition to the affordability standard of 30 percent, the definition of core housing need provided by CMHC 
also includes standards for adequacy of housing condition (that the unit does not require major repairs) and 
suitability (that the unit is of sufficient size and has enough bedrooms) (Melzer 2001).  Therefore, according 
to CMHC (Melzer 2001, 1); 
 
 “A household is said to be in core housing need if its housing falls below at least one of 
the adequacy, suitability, or affordability standards and it would have to spend 30 percent 
or more of its income to pay the average rent of alternative local market housing that meets 
all three standards.”  [emphasis not added] 
 
 The second problem with Toronto’s housing stock is the shortage of rental units.  Consistently low 
vacancy rates throughout the last decade indicate that Toronto has a very tight rental market.  CMHC 
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(Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation) housing statistics show that vacancy rates in Toronto have 
hovered at or below one percent over the past six years (CMHC 2001c).  New low-cost units are needed to 
bring the vacancy rate up to what is considered necessary for a balanced competitive market, which is 
approximately 3 percent (Dunphy 2001; FCM 2000).  However, the private sector has not been producing 
new rental units because there is more profit and less risk in the ownership market (HSWG 2001).  Private 
rental production dropped off considerably in the 1970s and in recent years there has been virtually no new 
production of rental units (CMHC 1999).  In fact, the supply of rental units has actually decreased in recent 
years because the number of existing units lost through demolitions and conversion of older apartment 
buildings to condominium ownership has exceeded the number of new rental units produced.  According to 
Daly and Milgrom (1998, 14), “during the first half of the 1990s only 150 private rental units were built each 
year, meeting less than 4% of the need for additional rentals.”  In 2001, only 39 new private rental units were 
constructed and many more existing units were lost, which is representative of production trends over the 
past four years (Lewington 2002).   
 Ever since the provincial government repealed the Rental Housing Protection Act in 1998, which had 
granted municipalities the authority to restrict the redevelopment or removal of multi-unit rental buildings, the 
City of Toronto has faced serious challenges in preserving the existing stock of rental housing (City of 
Toronto 2001a).  In terms of preserving the affordability of existing private rental units, the changes to rent 
control imposed by the Tenant Protection Act (also in 1998) have aggravated the situation.  Existing units 
are becoming more expensive due to vacancy decontrol.  Rising rents have meant that 60,000 units in the 
low-rent category of Toronto’s rental market were lost between 1991 and 1996 (City of Toronto 1999, 138).  
Overall, the impact of the increasingly tight rental market is surely felt by a large number of households 
throughout the city, as it is reported that more than half of Toronto’s households (an estimated fifty-two 
percent) are tenants (City of Toronto 2002a; Lorinc 1999). 
 The above noted tenure split between ownership and tenancy is a very important point because it 
proves how many people are affected by the rental shortage, but also because it underlines the affordability 
problem.  This is because average tenant household incomes are much lower than those of owner 
households.  The average tenant household income in 1995 in Ontario was $33,590 and the average owner 
household income for the same period was $66,179 (Statistics Canada 1996, quoted in ONPHA 1999, 21).  
Using the affordability standard of 30 percent of gross household income, this means that tenant households 
earning the average tenant income in Toronto can only afford to spend $839 per month on housing (the 
average tenant household income of $33,590 multiplied by 30 percent and divided by 12 months).  This 
presents a serious challenge because, based on the average rents reported by CMHC in October 2001, 
$839 is not quite enough for a one-bedroom apartment ($869/month) - it is only enough for a bachelor unit 
($699/month) (CMHC 2001, 42).  If the household in question is a family requiring three bedrooms, the 
average rent they would have to pay is $1,212/month, or approximately 43 percent of their income.  This is 
why so many of Toronto’s tenant households end up spending more than 30 percent of their income on rent. 
 
 To summarize the situation, due to a severe shortage in the supply of affordable rental units, 
Toronto’s housing stock does not match up with the housing needs of Toronto residents in terms of quantity, 
tenure, or price.  In order to correct the imbalance, the task for the municipality is to encourage construction 
of new affordable rental units while taking steps to preserve the existing stock.  An approach which focuses 
on adding to the housing supply is necessary because rental units simply don’t exist in sufficient numbers.  
This does not mean that income support is not necessary, just that support in the form of income 
supplements alone will not solve the housing problem if the affordable units don’t exist to be rented.  This 
leads into the third reason that Toronto needs affordable infill, which is that in major urban centres, any 
increase in housing supply must be through infill and intensification.  Simply put, if new affordable housing is 
to be constructed within the jurisdictional boundaries of the City of Toronto, where there is tremendous need, 
it must be through infill or intensification due to build-out.  Development already extends up to and beyond 
the municipal boundaries.  Fortunately, there is considerable potential for residential infill development on 
small vacant and underutilized sites in Toronto, such as surface parking lots, unoccupied industrial and 
commercial buildings, and low density retail areas.  There are also a few large parcels of land remaining in 
the city, such as the West Don lands, the railway lands, and the portlands (Daly and Milgrom 1998).  In 
1995, it was estimated that the total residential land inventory of vacant land in the City of Toronto could 
accommodate up to 265,000 new housing units (Daly and Milgrom 1998, 15).  Gladki et al (2002) also 
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estimate that there is considerable potential for new residential development within the City of Toronto.  
However, when exclusive infill developments consume remaining vacant lots, there are fewer sites available 
for affordable infill developments.  Thus, construction of affordable rental housing, on infill sites within Toronto 
in particular, is of critical importance due to shortages in supply, disproportionately high demand, and 
limited availability of land. 
 
1.3 The Estimated Shortage 
 As stated above, 45 percent of tenant households in Toronto were paying more than 30 percent of 
their income on rent in 1999.  Given that there has been a net decrease in the number of low-cost rental 
units on the market (Lewington 2002; Dunphy 2001; ONPHA 1999), the number of households experiencing 
affordability problems has likely increased.  Toronto’s shortage of low-cost rental units was recently 
estimated to be 143,000 units, which includes 37,000 households on the Toronto Social Housing 
Connections waiting list plus 106,000 households paying more than fifty percent of their income on rent  
(City of Toronto 1999, 140).  When all tenant households paying more than the thirty percent affordability 
standard are included, the estimated shortage of units in Toronto climbs to 270,160 (Statistics Canada 
1996b).  Demand for low-cost units continues to grow because of several factors, including changes in the 
structure of the labour market, newly imposed restrictions on employment insurance eligibility, cuts to 
welfare, overall decline in tenant incomes, and an increase in low-income households moving to Toronto 
(Layton 2000; Skaburskis and Mok 2000).  In fact, since the Mayor’s Homelessness Action Task Force 
Report was published in 1999, the number of households on the Toronto Social Housing Connections 
waiting list has grown substantially from 37,000 to 63,500 (Commissioner 2002a). 
 In response to the shortage, it is advocated that between 2,000 and 4,000 new affordable rental 
units per year are needed to meet the annual growth in affordable housing demand in Toronto, irrespective of 
the backlog of unmet need (Commissioner 2002a; City of Toronto 2001a; City of Toronto 1999; ONPHA 
1999).  This production goal is considered to be realistic (provided senior government support is reinstated), 
because similar quantities were produced in the years between 1973 and 1995 when there was more funding 
available (City of Toronto 1999).  It has been projected that if the supply shortfall is not  resolved, competition 
for rental units will intensify, rents will continue to rise, and the most severe consequences will be felt by 
those households with the lowest incomes (HSWG 2001).  
 In calculating the estimated affordable housing shortage it is important to include the percentage of 
household income spent on rent because waiting lists and data on shelter usage do not necessarily include 
the large number of households at imminent risk of homelessness.  Many housing advocates point out that 
homelessness figures are just the tip of the iceberg.  To explain, many households experiencing severe 
financial stress find that they are only one paycheque away from becoming homeless because so much of 
their income is spent on rent.  Some form of financial assistance is needed to bridge the gap between what 
low-income households can afford to pay and the current market rents.  However, the shelter component of 
welfare benefits has recently been cut back and the waiting period for assisted housing on the Toronto 
Soc ial Housing Connections waiting list is so long (estimated to be seven years) that some households 
don’t bother to fill out an application.  For larger families and people with special needs it can take as long 
as seventeen years to obtain financially assisted housing (City of Toronto 1999, iv).  In these situations, 
many households are forced to rely on food banks and share their unit with other households (which results 
in overcrowded living conditions) in order to continue making rent payments and avoid eviction.  To leave 




1.4 Linking Affordability Objectives to Purposeful Intensification 
 Study of the affordability of infill is necessary at this time because of the aforementioned affordability 
problems, but also because of new plans for intensification.  Within the City of Toronto’s newly adopted 
Official Plan (2002), there are specific areas zoned for intensification along arterial roads and transit lines, as 
well as in former industrial areas.  Recognizing the need to expand the City’s tax base and to implement 
transit-supportive land use policies, the plan states that development will be encouraged in designated 
growth and regeneration areas (City of Toronto 2002a).  While the plan could place greater emphasis on how 
important it is that new development in the designated growth areas specifically includes low-cost units, the 
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need for “a healthier balance” between rental and ownership units is discussed in the housing section and 
some measures have already been implemented.  These measures include a ‘housing first’ policy for 
surplus municipal lands, a new (lower) property tax rate for multi-residential properties, fee and charge 
exemptions for affordable non-profit housing developments, the establishment of a Capital Revolving Fund for 
Affordable Housing, and the Let’s Build program, which is designed to stimulate private sector investment in 
new affordable rental housing (City of Toronto 2002a, 3.2.1).  Also, a by-law permitting second suites in 
single and semi-detached houses has been enacted, although whether this will make a significant 
contribution to the supply of affordable units is questionable.  Despite the fact that there are many empty 
bedrooms in the older suburbs of Toronto, it is unlikely that second suites would be created in sufficient 
quantity, nor is it likely that they would be made available to the most needy households.  According to a 
recent study (HSWG 2001, 6), “while the secondary market plays an important role in providing affordable 
rental housing, it is a less secure source than purpose built rental housing.”  Further, because the 
availability of these units will fluctuate and affordability cannot be controlled, the basement suites provided 
by the secondary market “cannot be counted on as a stable long-term supply” (HSWG 2001, 6). 
 The specific housing policies pertaining to affordable rental units within the new official plan aim to 
preserve existing stock and provi de assistance to the private and non-profit sectors for the production of new 
units.  Various forms of municipal assistance are available and restrictions are imposed on the 
redevelopment of sites containing six or more rental units (although the legal basis of this redevelopment 
restriction is being challenged at the Ontario Municipal Board).  The policies also set minimum requirements 
for the inclusion of affordable units in large residential developments.  The requirement is a minimum of 20 
percent affordable units in projects that are larger than five hectares.  While this may be a positive step, the 
majority of infill developments would not be affected by this inclusionary requirement because most infill and 
intensification developments are situated on sites that are much smaller than five hectares. 
 While the new official plan projects a progressive vision of development in the city, the City of 
Toronto could achieve far more than increased density and transit efficiency by actively integrating plans for 
intensification with broader social objectives.  For example, the provision of more low-cost housing units 
would bring much needed advancement from the emergency assistance programs and shelters operating 
now, to a system that strives for prevention of homelessness.  This would improve the economic stability of 
low-income families, and by extension, there would also be improvements in public health, wellness, and the 
effectiveness of education and training programs.  This is simply because the stress of not having enough 
money for housing costs, nutritious food, clothing, and other basic necessities makes it difficult to maintain 
one’s health and take part in educational advancement or job training programs.  The social instability 
created by an affordable housing shortage can have a negative impact on a city over the long term because 
its economic competitiveness depends on maintaining a high quality of life and a knowledgeable and skillful 
workforce.  Job creation initiatives and training investments will only be wasted if corporations find the 
housing stock in a candidate city to be limited or inadequate (HSWG 2001).  According to Starr and Pacini 
(2001, 4), a broad range of housing types, including an adequate supply of affordable units, will help to 
“ensure the availability of a local labour force for all types of commercial activity,” thus making the city an 
attractive location for new or expanded operations.  Providing new low-cost housing units through infill and 
intensification is important, because Toronto is the number one destination for immigrants in Canada and 80 
percent of newcomer households rent their accommodation (City of Toronto 2002b).  The lack of rental 
housing for newcomers is bound to have a negative impact on the commercial sector because new 
immigrants are a major component of Canada’s labour force (HSWG 2001).  
 Another reason the City of Toronto should strive for the inclusion of low-cost units in infill 
developments is that the provision of permanent low-cost housing is less expensive than running an 
emergency shelter system (Starr and Pacini 2001; Let’s Build 2000).  In other words, preventing people from 
losing their housing in the first place is better for the people and for the municipal budget.  When one 
considers the social and economic costs of not ensuring access to adequate affordable housing it is clear 
that prevention of homelessness is cheaper than reacting to the consequences.  Inadequate housing has a 
negative effect on overall well-being, health, and productivity, which can lead to increased costs for the 
public health care system and other social services.  For those who don’t believe that housing should be 
treated as a right rather than a commodity, there are strong economic and budgetary arguments in favour of 
government assistance in the production of affordable housing. 
FES Outstanding Graduate Student Paper Series 
 
Creating Affordable Housing in Toronto Using Public Private Partnerships  
 
6 
 For each of these reasons, it is argued here that affordability objectives can and should be directly 
linked to intensification plans by encouraging or requiring the inclusion of low-cost units in infill projects.  In 
this regard, the City of Toronto is in a favourable position because growing interest in living downtown has 
created the level of nontransferable locational demand necessary for negotiating the inclusion of affordable 
units.  While mandatory requirements such as inclusionary zoning and linkage fees are advocated in the 
literature as effective measures for achieving affordable housing goals, at present there is a definite trend 
toward the partnership approach (Tomalty et al c.1999; White 1992).  Affordable housing is now being 
pursued through partnership programs in many Canadian cities.  Therefore, it is important to investigate how 
the partnership approach is working: to assess its advantages and disadvantages, to consider it in the 
context of government policies and market conditions, and to evaluate its success in getting new low-cost 
units built.  Taking note of the tools employed and lessons learned in completed projects and partnership 
programs used in other jurisdictions will help to ensure that the forthcoming intensification in Toronto’s 
designated growth areas will include low-cost housing. 
 
1.5 Future Directions: A More Compact Urban Form 
 Studies of ways to improve the affordability of infill are needed now because many recent 
government reports and policies have emphasized the compact urban form as the shape of future growth.  
Recent land use planning conference agendas, the publications of professional planning organizations, and 
urban studies journals have also focused on study of the compact urban form in recent years.  If the 
compact urban form is indeed a future direction for planning policies, it is important to consider why 
governments and planners are advocating a shift away from conventional, low density growth.  
 In recent years, there have been numerous reports from the federal, provincial, and municipal levels 
of government which express support for a more compact urban form.  For example, Canada’s Urban 
Strategy, the report of the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Urban Issues (PMTF 2002, 44) reports that, “It is 
important that the design of our communities be environmentally sensitive and utilize the land appropriately.”  
In this regard, the recommendations of the report specifically call for compact, mixed-use development.  
Similarly, Toronto’s Growing Together: Prospects for Renewal in the Toronto Region,  which was written in 
response to pressure for development on the Oak Ridges Moraine and concerns about air quality and traffic 
congestion, also calls for urban intensification.  This report identifies significant potential for accommodating 
growth within the built environment and estimates that the recommended intensification “would result in a 
38% reduction in the amount of land that would otherwise need to be urbanized” (Gladki et al 2002, 25).  
This finding echoes the results of earlier studies which also found considerable potential for the 
accommodation of growth on underutilized sites in Toronto (Berridge Lewinberg Greenberg Ltd., 1992 
referenced in Daly and Milgrom 1998; Isin 1991).  The Ontario government’s smart growth initiative, of which 
infill development is a significant component, promotes compact growth within urban growth boundaries and 
intensification along main streets and transit networks.  The Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing’s 
Ontario Smart Growth website explains that “unlocking gridlock and promoting livable communities” are 
priority issues, and lists “increasing the density of development; directing investment toward brownfield 
sites; and providing a wider range of housing options” among the strategic approaches required to resolve 
these issues (OMMAH 2002).  What is most interesting is the outright acknowledgment that 
accommodating central Ontario’s projected growth in population “requires rethinking how we plan our 
communities” (OMMAH 2002).  Collectively, these reports and policy initiatives indicate that all three levels 
of government are beginning to recognize the need to change conventional, sprawling patterns of growth. 
 
Conventional Development 
 In brief, the conventional growth pattern is characterized as low density expansion of single land use 
subdivisions at the urban periphery.  It is commonly found that the rate at which land is converted to 
development under the conventional growth pattern is not matched by population growth.  Beatley and 
Manning (1997) find that overall urban densities are declining and Hare (2001, 7) reports that “in the U.S., 
1% population growth in a metropolitan area means at least a 7% increase in land usage as a direct result 
of conventional development.”  Isin et al (1991, 5) also report on the form and density of conventional growth 
and conclude that the challenge of accommodating Toronto’s anticipated growth in population “cannot be 
met with [the] suburban development that has been experienced in the GTA.”  A broad range of problems 
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associated with low density urban expansion are well documented in the literature, including concerns about 
urban decline, regional economic health, municipal finance, socioeconomic exclusion, and environmental 
concerns, such as air pollution, loss of prime agricultural land, and inefficient energy consumption.  In this 
paper, discussion will be limited to the connections between urban decline, inefficient suburban expansion, 
and regional economic health. 
 The sprawling growth pattern and associated urban decline raise concerns about regional economic 
health because most suburbs depend heavily on central cities for jobs, major facilities, and the reputations 
of their metropolitan areas (Downs 1994).  It is argued that decline in the urban core will strain the economic 
competitiveness of an entire region by eroding quality of life and discouraging private investment (Daniels 
2001).  This is because a city’s ability to attract and retain businesses can deteriorate when the outward 
migration of affluent urban residents (seeking bigger homes for less money and lower property taxes) leaves 
its mark on urban centres in the form of an eroded tax base, aging infrastructure, and a disproportionate 
demand for services.  Over time, urban decline will affect the suburban municipalities as well.  Suchman and 
Sowell (1997, 5) refer to several studies which concluded that  
 
 “the fortunes of central cities and their suburbs move in concert.  Where cities tend to be 
strong and productive, suburban prosperity is greater.  There is a direct correlation between 
city-suburban disparity and economic growth.  Where disparities are great, economic 
growth is slower.”   
 
Thus, the symptoms of urban decline, such as the growing incidence and depth of poverty which has been 
observed in Toronto, can extend beyond the city and have a negative impact on economic conditions in the 
surrounding municipalities. 
 Meanwhile, the low density growth pattern complicates municipal finance for suburban 
municipalities because it fuels an unsustainable commitment to more growth.  As older subdivisions begin 
to require increased maintenance and social services, development proposals for new subdivisions must be 
approved in order to finance the growing service costs.  This is because the costs of servicing low density 
growth often exceed what the municipality receives in development charges and property taxes (Fodor 
1999).  Over time, it is argued that inefficient suburban expansion and urban decline will undermine the 
economic health of the entire region (Calthorpe and Fulton 2001; Orfield 1997; Downs 1994), because the 
city and its suburbs function interdependently as one economic unit (Rusk 1993).  This regional economic 
relationship is important because it means that even though residents of the outer suburbs do not pay for 
social services in the urban core and inner suburbs through their property taxes, they are not insulated from 
the consequences of urban decline.  According to Suchman and Sowell (1997, 3), “the continuing 
deterioration of many city neighbourhoods should be a matter of concern to all metropolitan-area residents, 
regardless of where they live.”  When one considers the importance of the GTA as a hub for production and 
innovation in Canada, it becomes clear that resolving the problems which contribute to regional disparity and 
social instability, such as the shortage of affordable housing in Toronto, should be a top priority of all three 
levels of government and not just the municipality.  In the words of Anthony Downs (1997, 67), “we can no 
longer indulge in the frontier mentality of simply moving farther outward to escape our problems, while 
leaving them behind, unresolved.”  Through development of low-cost housing on city owned infill sites, infill 
has the potential to reduce regional imbalances and exclusivity. 
 In light of these points, the apparent shift in policy and ideology from continued conventional growth 
to the encouragement of infill and intensification which has been noted in the reports and policies of the 
municipal, provincial, and federal levels of government should be regarded as progressive.   
 
1.6 The Planning Rationale for Promoting Affordable Infill 
 There is strong planning rationale for promoting affordable infill development which is rooted in 
concerns about the inefficient use of land, infrastructure, and energy.  The compact city form may facilitate 
the preservation of valuable agricultural land and greenspace in close proximity to urban centres.  The 
diversity of land uses and businesses found within higher densities may reduce dependency on motorized 
travel and eliminate the need for private automobile ownership.  Demographic considerations, such as the 
aging of the population and shrinking household sizes, also support the promotion of affordable infill 
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development in cities.  It is necessary to explore these arguments in the analysis of residential infill because 
of the fundamental connections between housing and land use, energy consumpt ion, and the social aspects 
of everyday life.  As stated by Seelig and Seelig (1995, 190), debate about housing must be reintegrated 
into “a more comprehensive view of the neighbourhood.  Housing must be viewed in conjunction with the 
location of shopping and of workplaces, with the design of main streets, and with the general daily schedule 
of human activities.” 
 
Efficient Use of Land 
 Compared with low density greenfield development, infill promises improved efficiency in the amount 
of land dedicated to urban uses.  To explain, building on underutilized or vacant lots within a city allows for 
the preservation of environmentally significant and agricultural lands at the urban fringe.  Some critics charge 
that concern about the conversion of farms into subdivisions is borne out of mere nostalgia for pastoral 
settings and that there is no danger of “cities encroaching on reserves of ‘prime’ agricultural land” (Gordon 
and Richardson 1997, 96).  While this may or may not be true in the United States, which is the context of 
Gordon and Richardson’s article, the circumstances are different in Canada.  In fact, considering that most 
Canadian cities are located within areas of high quality agricultural land and that very little Canadian land is 
suitable for agriculture, it is clear that the protection of prime agricultural land from urban expansion is 
indeed necessary for food production 
(Paehlke 1991).   
 Using the Canada Land Inventory 
(CLI) system of classification, only land 
classes 1 to 3 are considered “dependable” 
agricultural lands, which means that only 5 
percent of Canada’s total land area is 
suitable for long-term agriculture use 
(Statistics Canada 2000, 126).  It has been 
determined that 52 percent of Canada’s CLI 
class 1 land is located in southern Ontario, 37 
percent of which is visible from the top of the CN 
Tower in Toronto (Statistics Canada 2000, 
126).  These figures send a powerful 
message when one considers what is now 
visible from the top of the CN Tower.  While it is 
not surprising that most Canadian urban 
centres are located within areas of high 
agricultural value, given that these centres have 
emerged from early farming communities, it is a significant point which merits attention in studies of urban 
growth and land use planning.  The amount of CLI class 1 land occupied by urban uses in Ontario reached 
19 percent in 1996 (Statistics Canada 2000, 126).  Hare (2001, i) reports that “between 1976 and 1996 the 
Greater Toronto Area lost 150,000 acres of prime farmland to urbanization.”  Given that conventional growth 
continues to expand urban boundaries, that number has likely risen in the past six years.  With so much of 
the CLI class 1 land concentrated near the Greater Toronto Area (note the areas marked in red on the map), 
it is of particular concern that the municipalities of Peel, Halton, York, and Durham are the fastest growing 
municipalities in central Ontario (Ministry of Finance 2000, quoted in OMMAH 2002).  These figures and 
growth trends confirm that because of the location of Canada’s best agricultural land and the location of its 
large cities, urban expansion into prime agricultural land is indeed cause for concern.  
 
Infrastructural Efficiency 
 Another potential source of improved efficiency is the fact that costly infrastructure expansions are 
often not necessary for infill developments (Haughey 2001).  This is because they are located within areas 
that are already served by road networks, transit systems, water and sewer piping and treatment facilities, 
hospitals, schools, and libraries.  These public services and utilities infrastructure represent considerable 
municipal expenditure and investment.  According to Blais (1995, 40), “a study prepared for the Greater 
Source: Statistics Canada (2000)
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Toronto Area Task Force estimated infrastructure costs in the GTA over the next 25 years under current 
development patterns at $55 billion, with an additional $14 billion required for operation and maintenance.”  
The costs of infrastructure expansion are already an issue for municipalities, given that the current municipal 
infrastructure deficit in Canada has been estimated to be in the billions of dollars.  Blais estimates that $0.7 
to $1.0 billion could be saved each year if a more efficient development pattern were used for future GTA 
growth (1995, 41).  These figures indicate that infill presents a valuable opportunity to minimize municipal 
expenditure on infrastructure expansions.  Although it is possible that infill developments could require 
infrastructure upgrades to increase operational capacity or modernize aging equipment, most municipal 
utilities operate below capacity and would actually benefit from more users.  In the event that upgrades were 
required, infill developments could utilize various forms of green infrastructure and building technologies, 
such as those used in the CMHC Healthy House demonstration project in Toronto (Ledger 1997).   
 
Energy Efficiency 
 Infill development may contribute to significant reductions in energy consumption because higher 
density settlements support non-motorized forms of transportation such as cycling and walking.  This is 
simply because the physical distances between homes, offices, shopping, and recreation are shorter than 
they are in low density settlements with separated land uses.  Furthermore, parking costs and slower travel 
speeds discourage traveling by car in areas of high density, which makes the non-motorized options more 
attractive.  In addition to walking and cycling, high densities also improve the feasibility of transit service 
provision because there is a larger pool of potential riders in any given area.  These arguments are contested 
by Gordon and Richardson (1997) and Handy and Clifton (2001), who counter that shorter distances will 
merely translate to shorter car trips and that consumer preference will prevail over intentions to shop locally 
and reduce car use.  Yet, within the same article Handy and Clifton concede that conventional development 
patterns not only reduce transportation choice, but actually eliminate choice, make driving a necessity for 
most daily trips.  In this regard, studies have shown that people value having alternatives to the car, and that 
when land use patterns support such options, car use declines.  A study commissioned by CMHC (Hunt 
Analytics Inc. 1999, 31) on the impact of urban form on private vehicle use found that  
 
 “as walk accessibility at the home location increases, households tend to own fewer autos 
... with the end result that they tend to make less use of their autos overall” and that 
“making activities physically closer ... results in substantial reductions in VKT” (vehicle 
kilometers traveled) (1999, 30).   
 
As further evidence that automobile dependency can be reduced through land use planning, Barton (2000, 
107) cites research which indicates that “car ownership varies inversely with density ... even when 
socioeconomic variables are held constant.”  Similarly, Newman and Kenworthy (1999, 78) analysed data on 
per capita transportation fuel consumption patterns, and the results of their study proved that “the extent to 
which economic factors influence car use can be questioned.”  This means that although factors such as 
price and disposable income are influential, the perceived necessity for motorized travel due to density and 
land use patterns is also highly significant.  Daly and Milgrom (1998, iii) report that in Toronto’s urban core, 
where density is 7100 people per square kilometer, two-thirds of all trips are by transit.  Although served by 
the same transit system, ridership is lower in Toronto’s inner suburbs where densities are not as high.  On 
the need for planning mechanisms to reduce automobile dependence, Newman and Kenworthy call for 
higher density land use and mixed use zoning to reduce the need for motorized travel.   
 In addition to improved transportation efficiency, it should be noted that the energy consumption of 
buildings themselves may also be reduced due to the inherent efficiencies of multiple dwelling units, such as 
reduced exterior wall space and expanded opportunities for district heating (Paehlke 1991). 
 
Social and Environmental Benefits  
 In addition to these efficiency arguments, several authors report on the social and environmental 
benefits of the compact urban form (Beatley 2000; Roseland 1998; Duany et al 2000; Hough 1995; Jacobs 
1961).  For example, Beatley refutes the argument that compact cities leave no room for urban greenspace.  
While it is an understandable concern that infill development could displace urban greenspace, Beatley 
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notes several European cities (e.g. Freiburg, Helsinki, and Copenhagen) which effectively demonstrate that 
compact form and protected greenspace can coexist, even with “large wedges of greenspace and nature 
[that] extend into the very centre” (Beatley 2000, 63).  Similarly, a study of intensification policies in three 
U.K. boroughs (Williams 2000, 37) which looked at the protection of urban greenspace found that when 
preservation of such places is given priority “from the outset of proposed developments ... then losses [of 
urban greenspace] are not inevitable.”  Beatley extends the argument that intensified development and 
nature can coexist, stating that “it is the very compactness that allows these networks of greenspace to 
exist in such proximity to large populations” (2000, 63).  This assertion is supported by Hough (1995), who 
argues that the compact city form can facilitate the preservation of ecologically valuable urban greenspaces 
while simultaneously enhancing the built environment by maximizing the visibility of wildlife and natural 
processes for urban inhabitants. 
 In exploring the social benefits of the compact urban form, Roseland (1998, 138) cites studies of 
residential satisfaction which indicate that “the relative disadvantages of low density communities are 
increasing.”  The main disadvantage noted by Roseland is that as more households become two-income 
households, those in low density areas must choose between the financial burden of a second car and the 
compromised accessibility of doing without.  However, it has been estimated that after taxes and daycare, 
the second income in many households pays for little more than the second car (Duany et al 2000).  In this 
way, the low densities and separation of land uses that are characteristic of conventional subdivisions have 
a negative financial impact on each household.  It is argued by Duany et al (2000), that one of the most 
effective ways to increase the affordability of housing would be to eliminate the need for a private automobile.  
This would translate into tremendous savings, considering that the average household in Ontario spends 
$8,515 per year on transportation (Statistics Canada 2001b).  Given the high rate of automobile ownership in 
Ontario, it can be assumed that the majority of reported transportation expenses are related to privately 
owned vehicles and not public transportation. 
 Jacobs (1961) supports the compact urban form because of the contributions that high residential 
densities make to a neighbourhood’s diversity, vitality, and convenience.  According to Jacobs, “city 
dwellings have to be intensive in their use of the land, for reasons that go much deeper than cost of land” 
(1961, 202).  Specifically, it is argued that a high density of dwellings is important for the vitality, diversity, 
and future development of city districts.  Jacobs notes that higher concentrations of people help to generate 
greater diversity in the shops and services that are available within an area and increase the level of activity 
within the public realm.  Among other factors, such as a mixture of commercial and residential uses and a 
range of dwelling sizes and types, “dense concentrations of people are one of the necessary conditions for 
flourishing city diversity” (Jacobs 1961, 205 emphasis not added). 
 
Demographic Considerations 
 Another important consideration which lends support for infill is that demographic change is creating 
more demand for housing in general, with greater demand for high-density residential environments in 
particular.  To some extent this is already evident and projections by CMHC (1999, 97) indicate that 
“demographic factors over the next 20 years will generate a need for roughly 50,000 to 60,000 additional 
units in Canada per year even without allowing for replacement of any units lost from within the existing 
stock.”  Dramatic decreases in household size (from 3.7 people per household in 1971, to 2.8 in 2001) are 
generating increased demand for housing units in general (Statistics Canada 2003; Statistics Canada 
2001a).  As household sizes decrease, a great deal of the existing housing stock becomes underutilized, 
particularly when homeowners choose to ‘age in place.’  To explain, many houses in the inner suburbs 
containing four or more bedrooms are occupied by only one or two people when the children grow up and 
move out.  The overall demand for housing increases when what was formerly one household splits to 
become two (or more) households, each requiring separate units despite the availability of space in the 
former housing unit.  The former living space (bedrooms, etc.) of the adult children often remains empty, 
unless the house is renovated to contain a second suite which can be rented to another household. 
 While some empty nesters are choosing to age in place, there is also a growing interest in living 
downtown for the ease of access to shopping, entertainment, and cultural venues.  The ability to reach such 
destinations without getting in the car is particularly appealing.  In the words of Myers and Gearin (2001, 
645), “the aging of the baby boomers is remaking the residential landscape of America” due to a growing 
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preference for compact city housing among home buyers and renters over the age of 45.  Demand for 
downtown dwelling units is also strong among young professionals.  The problem with this trend is that 
increased demand for housing in general, combined with the growing preference for living downtown have 
directly contributed to the high rents and purchase prices in the City of Toronto.  As explained by Burton 
(2000), affordability is strongly related to demand for housing, because in areas of high demand, the market 
value of the land is also high.  This pressure on rents and prices makes it important to find ways to improve 
the affordability of infill developments.  
 
 Collectively, these points indicate that infill and intensification can play an important role in 
protecting agricultural land and greenspace at the urban fringe, providing accessible living environments for 
those who cannot or choose not to drive, reducing municipal spending on infrastructure expansion, and 
creating new housing opportunities in the city.  At a time when the loss of agricultural land, automobile 
dependence, municipal budget shortfalls, and affordable housing shortages are such critical planning issues, 
it appears that infill and intensification have a lot to offer. 
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Part Two: The Partnership Strategy in Context 
 
2.1 Emergence of the Partnership Strategy 
 Public-private partnerships, also called joint ventures, are an emerging trend in the production of 
affordable housing in Canadian municipalities.  The partnership strategy has been selected as the focus of 
this study for several reasons.  First, it has been calculated that the private sector simply cannot produce 
housing that is affordable to low-income households without some form of subsidy (City of Toronto 1999; 
Pomeroy et al 1998; Suchman and Sowell 1997).  Even for the construction of modest housing units, the 
break-even rents are higher than what is considered to be affordable for many low-income households (City 
of Ottawa 2002a; City of Toronto 1999).  Similarly, the years following the withdrawal of senior government 
funding have shown that municipalities lack sufficient funding and resources to produce low-cost housing on 
their own.  Since the federal non-profit housing programs ended in 1993 and provincial programs ended in 
1995, no new assisted projects have been built in the City of Toronto, except those that were already in 
progress (City of Toronto 2001a).  Therefore, based on the situation created by government funding shortfalls 
and current market conditions, it appears that affordable housing production will require a partnership 
between public and private sectors.  This observation is echoed throughout the literature and a trend toward 
public-private partnerships has been noted in Canada and the United States (Burdick and Kawahara 2002; 
Tomalty et al c.1999; Pomeroy et al 1998; Canadian Housing and Renewal Association 1991; Carter and 
McAfee 1990; Keyes 1990). 
 By definition, a public-private partnership involves shared risks and shared decision making between 
partners in the public and private sectors.  According to the US General Accounting Office (quoted in 
Pomeroy et al 1998, 2),  
 
 “In contrast to privatization, contracting out, or other arrangements between the public and 
private sectors, a partnership signifies that both public and private sectors share risks and 
responsibilities in order to meet critical community needs, as defined by the partners.  
Shared risk means that both partners could lose resources; it encourages the involvement 
of both public and private sectors in ventures that neither sector could successfully attempt 
alone.” 
 
The following definition has been adopted by the Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships and 
makes similar references to shared risk and responsibilities in venturing to meet public or community needs 
(CMHC 1999, 30):  
 
 “A cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each 
partner, that best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of 
risks, rewards, and responsibilities.” 
 
Potential partners within the public sector include municipalities, municipally owned non-profit housing 
providers, provincial and federal governments, and government funded agencies such as the Canadian 
Centre for Public-Private Partnerships in Housing (CCPPPH) division of the Canadian Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation (CMHC).  According to the Canadian Housing and Renewal Association’s review of partnerships, 
most formal partnership projects have been done in major cities by municipal housing corporations (CHRA 
1991).  Private sector partners may include independent non-profit housing providers, for-profit developers, 
and private sector investors. 
 In terms of affordable housing production, partnerships allow municipalities to benefit from private 
sector investment, which helps to reduce expenditure of limited public funds.  A partnership arrangement 
offers great potential because it combines private sector expertise, efficiency, and resources with the 
financial and regulatory tools of the municipality.  Within a partnership arrangement, municipalities may 
choose to allow greater flexibility in permitted height, density, site configuration, open space and parking 
requirements, and mixed-use zoning, or opt to provide financial incentives in exchange for the inclusion of 
low-cost rental units.  Financial incentives can take a variety of forms, including long term leases on 
municipally owned land, loans, grants, tax credits, reduced property taxes, and waived application and 
FES Outstanding Graduate Student Paper Series 
 
Creating Affordable Housing in Toronto Using Public Private Partnerships  
 
13 
development fees.  Given that delays can increase financing costs, offering a streamlined approval process 
for developments containing a certain percentage of affordable units can also be considered a financial 
incentive.  This report will focus primarily on the use of financial incentives in public-private partnerships.   
 The benefits of partnership arrangements do not only flow in the direction of the private sector 
partners.  Private sector involvement in affordable housing production provides benefits to the municipality as 
well.  The private sector partner may be able to contribute equity to the project, which is important for 
obtaining mortgage financing, or they may own land which can be used for the project.  Another advantage 
for the municipality is that if the financial incentives offered to the private partner are not direct subsidies, 
such as a forgivable loan, then the new housing does not necessarily impose a heavy financial burden on 
the municipality.  To explain, while forgone property taxes, development charges, and permit fees do 
represent lost revenue, in many cases the forgone revenue is dismissed as potential revenue only 
(Commissioner 2002c).  This is because the projects would not be developed in the absence of municipal 
assistance, meaning that there would be little chance of collecting property taxes and development charges 
for those sites anyway (Commissioner 2002c).  Furthermore, the losses of forgone property taxes and 
development charges would be substantially lower than the administrative and operating costs of actually 
constructing and managing the buildings independently, without private sector involvement. 
 
Project Viability 
 As mentioned above, the private sector cannot provide units at rents that are affordable to many of 
the City of Toronto’s low-income households.  Thus, market conditions provide important reasons to explore 
public-private partnerships in this paper, particularly when striving for improved affordability on infill sites.  To 
explain, there are a number of challenges associated with infill development which are not encountered to 
the same extent with greenfield development.  Additional challenges of infill include working with small or 
oddly shaped sites, ensuring compatibility with adjacent land uses, earning the acceptance and support of 
the infill site’s neighbours, and obtaining the necessary zoning changes and site plan approvals (Suchman 
and Cole 2001; Farris 2001; Haughey 2001; White 1992; Smart 1985).  These challenges can add expenses 
and delays, so from the developer’s viewpoint an infill project is only viable if it guarantees a greater return on 
their investment than would a comparable greenfield project.  Consequently, in order to ensure that the 
costs of development do not exceed market value, most infill developments cater to the high-end of the real 
estate market (Suchman and Cole 2001).  This is because there is a larger profit margin and less risk in the 
high-end and ownership markets, which helps to compensate the developer for the higher land costs and 
added complexity of infill development. 
 In general, the economics for new purpose-built private sector rental housing have been poor in 
recent years.  Considering that projected returns rank highest of the factors which determine whether a 
project is viable and that in Toronto, the potential returns for new rental unit development are “well below the 
minimum 15 percent that developers are typically seeking” it is not surprising that the private sector is 
reluctant to build rental properties  (CMHC 1999, 74).  Further, as it has been determined that “the cost of 
building affordable rental is typically only slightly less than building high end” (HSWG 2001, 13), it is not 
surprising that high-end developments “are usually the only projects that the private sector is willing to build 
on its own” (HSWG 2001, 5).  However, not only has there been a sharp decline in affordable rental 
production, but in high-end rental production as well.  As stated in the introduction, only 0 to 3 percent of 
development in Toronto has been in private rental unit production in recent years, which includes low and 
high ends of the market (ONPHA 1999, 86).  According to a CMHC survey of private sector developers 
(1999, iii), “the main disadvantages [of rental development] are perceived as the extent of government 
intervention and high property taxes.”  A recent study conducted by the City of Ottawa (2002a) also found 
that changes to the Income Tax Act, the Goods and Services Tax, and the Provincial Sales Tax are related 
to low private sector production of rental units.  Disputed government interventions include rent control, 
legislation governing landlord and tenant rights, and restrictions on the transfer of renovation costs to 
tenants, all of which are said to negatively affect the viability of rental development.  Until recently, higher 
property tax rates (roughly four times higher) for multi-unit rental buildings had created a direct incentive to 
build condominiums rather than rental apartments.  Another reason developers are choosing to build 
ownership housing rather than rental is that the developer is able to sell condominium units before 
construction, whereas rental units do not produce any equity or returns until after project completion.   
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 Overall, it appears that if the shortage of affordable rental housing is to be resolved, the economics 
of private sector rental development must be improved.  The developers surveyed in the CMHC study (1999) 
provided several recommendations for improving the economics of new rental housing development.  Some 
of the recommendations correspond with the incentives currently provided through the City of Toronto’s 
partnership program.  For example, the developers recommended reducing government -imposed costs, such 
as development charges, lengthy approvals processes, and high property tax assessment rates (CMHC 
1999). 
 It is also important to look at market demand because it has a significant impact on affordability.  
According to Burton (2000), although high densities are sometimes thought to cause an increase in housing 
prices, it is not the density itself but rather the high land values which are created by high demand.  Burton’s 
research concludes that affordability is most strongly related to demand for housing, while “the density in a 
city is simply a reflection of this demand” (2000, 1984).  In the City of Toronto, demand for housing in 
general has been strong due to decreasing household sizes (only 2.8 people per household in 2001).  
Similarly, demand for housing in the urban core has been strong due to a growing interest in living downtown 
among young professionals and empty nesters, which has put upward pressure on housing prices (Myers 
and Gearin 2001; Daly and Milgrom 1998).  The growing popularity of infill housing is well documented in the 
literature (McIlwain 2002; Haughey 2002; Suchman and Cole 2001; Fader 2000).  In sum, as long as 
demand is strong in general and particularly strong in downtown areas, developers will cater first to the 




 Recent changes to the Ontario Municipal Act also provide good reason to explore the partnership 
strategy at this point in time.  Under Ontario Regulation 189/01, Section 210.1 of the Municipal Act now 
permits municipalities to extend the financial incentives which were previously restricted to non-profit 
housing providers, to for-profit private developers (Commissioner 2002c, 4).  The addition of municipal 
housing project facilities to the list of eligible municipal capital facilities for which municipal councils may 
enter into agreements with both for-profit and non-profit companies is what has expanded opportunities for 
municipal partnerships.  The incentives include “giving or lending any property of the municipality, including 
money; guaranteeing borrowing; leasing or selling any property of the municipality at below fair market value; 
and giving a total or partial exemption from any levy, charge or fee” (Municipal Act Chapter M.45, Section 
111).  This means that there are now both regulatory-based tools (permitted under the density bonusing 
provisions in Section 37 of the Planning Act) and incentive-based tools available to municipalities wishing to 
work with private developers on the production of low-cost housing.  In accordance with this change in 
provincial regulation, the Municipal Housing Facilities By-law (By-law No. 282-2002) was recently enacted 
(Commissioner 2002b, 3).  This new by-law clearly defines what is meant by “affordable housing,” states 
policies regarding eligibility and tenant access criteria for the housing units to be created, and summarizes 
the provisions that partnership agreements are required to contain.  Overall, this change is seen as a 
positive development by many in the field (Zimmerman 2002; Wood 2003) and there is considerable interest 
in how this will affect private sector construction of affordable units in the near future.   
 To summarize, the partnership strategy has emerged in response to the situation created by 
chronic government funding shortfalls, recent housing program cancellations, and the effect of market 
conditions on private sector development.  Research of the partnership strategy is required at this time to 
determine whether it is effective in achieving affordability objectives and production targets.  The growing 
popularity of public-private partnerships in Canada and the United States and recent changes to the Ontario 
Municipal Act which allow municipalities to extend financial incentives to for-profit private developers also 
contribute to the need for further research of the partnership strategy. 
 
2.2 Overview of Canadian Housing Policy  
 In order to better understand why there has been a shift toward the use of partnerships for affordable 
housing production, and to better understand future directions in housing policy, it is important to explore 
the theories, political motivations, and criticisms that have shaped Canadian housing policies over time.  By 
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way of introduction, this section will commence with a summary of general trends and criticisms, which is 
followed by a more detailed account of Canadian housing policies.   
 While the homelessness crisis has now reached unprecedented levels in Toronto and other 
Canadian cities, the provision of housing for low-income Canadians has been a problem in Canada 
throughout the last century.  In fact, some would argue that providing adequate housing for those 
households in the lowest income range has always been a challenge (Keyes 1990).  There have been 
various responses from all levels of government, each with varying degrees of success.  Canadian housing 
policy analysts point out four commonalities which have been evident in most government programs and 
policies.  First, most government programs and funding policies have been designed to assist home 
ownership through loans and tax incentives, with comparatively little assistance provided for rental housing.  
Second, there has been considerable reliance on the ability of the private sector to provide the necessary 
housing, and faith in the notion that as new housing was built, older housing would filter down to become 
occupied by low-income households.  Third, most federal programs have been in the form of market support 
(assisting private lenders by providing mortgage insurance) and by providing funds for municipally-led 
projects, rather than direct involvement in housing provision.  A fourth observation of Canadian housing policy 
is that “there has never been a consistently high level of subsidy, rather an on-again / off-again pattern” 
(Fallis and Murray 1990, 71).  Thus, the production of affordable housing in both the public and private 
sectors has been hampered by great fluctuations in policies and subsidy commitments. 
 Each of these trends in the government approach to housing provision has sparked criticism.  The 
emphasis on promotion of home ownership rather than rental assistance has contributed to the most 
common criticism of Canadian housing policy, which is that many government programs have been poorly 
targeted and have helped middle- and upper-income households more than low-income households.  This is 
largely because of the substantial investment required to purchase even a modest home.  In this regard, 
Sewell (1994, 117) argues that, “support for private rental housing and renters has never been at the forefront 
of housing policy in Canada” and that “the aim of Canadian housing policy has been to make ownership of a 
detached house, and more recently, a condominium apartment or townhouse, a feasible option for those 
that qualify for a mortgage” (Hulchanski 1988, 18 quoted in Sewell 1994, 117). 
 Further to the unbalanced emphasis on ownership assistance, the theory that older housing would 
filter down to low-income households as new ownership housing was built did not pan out as expected.  The 
housing in many older neighbourhoods appreciated in value, some older housing was demolished and 
replaced with new expensive housing, and some older housing was upgraded, which meant that older 
housing did not filter down to the low-income households.  In the end, the low-income households were no 
better off.  Some of the programs which assisted private developers in housing production were equally 
ineffective in helping low-income households because landlords often favoured middle-income households in 
their selection of tenants.  These programs have also been criticized as inefficient for providing excessive 
financial benefits to developers at considerable public expense.  A final criticism that has been common to 
Canadian housing policies over the years is that more often than not, housing programs have been launched 
to stimulate a declining economy by creating construction jobs, rather than out of genuine concern for the 
problems of overcrowding, inadequate or unsanitary living conditions, and homelessness (Fallis and Murray 
1990).  Details of the government programs and the arguments which have informed this summary are 
explored in greater detail below. 
 
Late 1800s - Mid 1900s 
 In the late 1800s and early 1900s, there was simply not enough housing (or jobs and wages) to 
match the urban migration which was spurred by the growth of industrial firms in Canada’s major urban 
centres.  Local initiatives, such as the Cottage Home Builders Association of 1907, the Toronto Housing 
Company of 1913, and the Toronto Housing Commission of 1920, preceded federal involvement in housing 
provision (Greene 1991).  These local initiatives experienced some success, producing several hundred 
houses each, but the leaders of the organizations eventually found that “the two goals [which were to provide 
housing for people of limited means and to ensure that the city didn’t lose money in the provision of said 
housing] were incompatible and gave up” (Greene 1991, 26).  The depression of the 1930s made things 
worse because lenders were less willing to finance projects, housing starts slowed overall, and property 
values fell.   
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 It was with the Dominion Housing Act of 1935, the first explicit federal housing policy, and the 
National Housing Act of 1938 that the federal government became involved in housing (Fallis 1995).  The 
purpose of these two Acts was to encourage the distribution of loans for building houses for private 
ownership, but critics charge that the government only “fell into the housing field accidentally” (Wilson 1959, 
219 quoted in Fallis 1995, 7) and that the true objective was relief of unemployment.  According to Greene 
(1991, 27), the quantity of housing produced under these Acts was insignificant (only 4903 DHA assisted 
units created) and they failed to help those in greatest need of assistance.  This is because in order to 
benefit from the programs one would have to have enough money for a down payment and a high enough 
income to carry the mortgage; not to mention that the housing produced was relatively expensive compared 
to wages at the time (greater than $3000).  In this period, the strongest federal involvement was with 
Wartime Housing Limited, which produced 26,000 rental housing units (Greene 1991, 28).  Wartime Housing 
Limited was later merged with the Veterans’ Rental Housing program and almost 50,000 homes were built 
(Sewell 1994, 132).  Unfortunately, when the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) was 
created in 1945 to replace the Department of Finance in administering the Dominion Housing Act and the 
National Housing Act, Wartime Housing Limited was dismantled, integrated with CMHC, and the rental 
housing units were sold off (Sewell 1994).  This is considered unfortunate because once the units were sold, 
prices could no longer be controlled, and they were essentially lost from the supply of affordable housing. 
 
1940s - 1970s 
 After the Second World War, there was a push for housing in response to the shortage of dwellings 
available for the families of returning soldiers and, once again, high unemployment rates.  Federal loans and 
grants were delivered through the municipalities because the provinces lacked the administrative and 
financial means to assume responsibility for housing programs.  CMHC provided assistance to developers in 
the form of loans and joint loans with private financial institutions.  Federal tax treatment, capital gains tax, 
and depreciation allowances also encouraged private sector rental construction.  The main criticism of 
housing policies in this period is that little was done to improve housing conditions for low-income 
households.  There was too much faith in the assumption that as better housing was built, the houses 
formerly occupied by middle- and upper-income households would fall in price and filter down to low-income 
households.  Sewell (1994, 117) argues that despite its failure in practice “the filter-down approach has 
proved to have a long political shelf life” because it favours the middle-and upper-income households who 
have greater political leverage.  This is an important point because the political acceptability of a policy will 
often determine its fate.  Some feel that political appeal is a key strength of the partnership strategy 
because it does not necessarily impose a heavy financial burden which would in turn lead to higher taxes.  
Further, the public costs of an affordable housing partnership are often in the form of forgone taxes and 
charges, which are less visible to the public than direct expenditure of collected funds. 
 Social housing in the form of publicly owned rent-geared-to-income (RGI) units became a focus of 
federal housing policy in the mid-1960s (Fallis 1995).  Slum clearance and large scale urban redevelopment 
projects such as Toronto’s Regent Park, Moss Park, and Don Mount Court were initiated by the federal and 
municipal governments at this time.  A significant number of units were produced in these programs (at its 
height in 1971, ten percent of all housing starts were public housing), but critics charged that because the 
assisted housing was fixed in one large location, tenants felt stigmatized (Fallis 1995).  In order to reduce 
the stigma of social housing, the focus shifted to the provision of mixed-income housing where only 25 
percent of units were rented to low-income households.  Although there was (and still is) support for mixed-
income developments, the mixed-income housing programs were still flawed in that they failed to reach 
some of the poorest households by limiting low-income occupancy to 25 percent of the total development.  
Critics argued that the most disadvantaged households should be the first priority of publicly funded housing 
programs.   
 In 1964, changes to the National Housing Act improved upon previous attempts at cost-sharing 
between the provincial and federal governments.  The changes meant that CMHC would provide 90 percent 
of capital costs, which reduced provincial responsibility from 25 percent to only 10 percent, but operating 
losses would be shared equally (Fallis 1995).  This development has been called “the turning point which put 
all questions of whether decent housing would be built squarely in the laps of the provincial governments” 
(Fallis 1995, 136).  Up to this point, involvement in housing provision was limited to the federal and municipal 
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governments.  Later in 1964, Ontario established the Ontario Housing Corporation, which began acquiring 
small buildings and municipally-sponsored projects and encouraged new public housing construction - but 
only at the request of the municipalities. 
 In the 1970s, the Rent Supplement Program was launched as an attempt to provide housing 
assistance without dictating where tenants must live.  The program still exists today, although it is now 
administered by the provincial governments.  Under this program, tenants from the social housing waiting list 
pay a rent geared to their income for a unit in a private apartment building, with the remainder of the market 
rent funded by the federal and provincial governments (Fallis 1995).  The advantage of the Rent Supplement 
Program is that the assistance is more effectively targeted to those in need.  In other words, the program 
only assists low-income tenants - not landlords, developers, or middle-income tenants as some of the 
programs which assisted housing development have done (such as the Limited Dividend Program and the 
Capital Cost Allowance program).  However, because the program subsidizes occupation of existing units 
rather than adding to the housing stock it only works when there is a high vacancy rate in the rental market 
and the housing problem is one of affordability and not supply (Sewell 1994).  Another shortcoming is that 
the program does not yield long term benefits.  According to Sewell (1994, 128), there is “no continuing 
benefit from the money spent” because “when the lease expires, the tenants must move on” and the 
formerly subsidized units return to market rents. 
 The Non-Profit Housing Assistance and Cooperative Assistance Programs were created in 1973, 
and combined with the Rent Supplement Program were found to be more effective than public housing 
initiatives and (for-profit) private sector housing programs in producing low-cost housing (Fallis 1995).  
According to Pomeroy et al (1998, 30), “even as funding levels fluctuated between 1973 and 1993 ... Canada 
developed what some perceived to be one of the best and most efficient non-profit housing systems in the 
world.”  In fact, the success of the non-profit system during this period is largely why public-private 
partnerships are a relatively new phenomenon in Canada, as compared with the United States.  The Rent 
Supplement Program, which helped to place tenants from the social housing waiting list in private buildings 
was celebrated for giving tenants greater choice in terms of housing location.  The program subsidized the 
difference between market rent and ability to pay through a federal-provincial cost sharing arrangement.  
Cancellation of the non-profit and cooperative housing programs in the 1990s had a devastating effect on 
affordable housing production overall because these programs accounted for a significant amount of all 
housing starts.  However, it must be noted that these programs, particularly the co-op housing program, 
were sharply criticized for providing new housing at considerable public expense to “well-educated, middle-
class renters” rather than those in greatest need of assistance (Poulton 1995, 63).  This is because the 
projects were mixed-income developments that provi ded assisted housing to low-, medium-, and even upper-
income households. 
 
1980s - Present 
 The 1980s saw the beginning of federal downloading of housing responsibility to the provinces and 
overall reductions in government spending on housing.  In 1986, the provinces signed agreements with the 
federal government for provincial delivery of remaining federal housing programs (Greene 1991).  Due to 
concerns about inefficiency and poorly targeted programs, federal non-profit mixed-income projects were 
terminated in 1985.  It was found that the subsidies per unit were too high and that “much of the money was 
not going to low-income households” (Fallis 1995, 15).  In fact, “the co-op program was one of the most 
expensive social housing programs on a per unit basis that the federal government ever produced” (Poulton 
1995, 68).  Concerns about the federal deficit led to limitations on planned growth in housing assistance, 
with severe program cuts made in 1986 and again in 1993.  According to Poulton (1995), the spending cap 
imposed by the federal government in 1993 left only enough funding to maintain existing commitments.  
Further cuts were made in the 1995 federal budget and with the funds remaining “virtually no social housing 
units can be built” (Fallis 1995, 19).  In general, opposition to government intervention in housing and a pro-
market philosophy took hold in the 1980s because it was felt that government involvement in the market had 
“stifled entrepreneurial spirit and innovation” (Greene 1991, 35).  The federal government sought to improve 
the cost effectiveness of housing assistance by reducing program commitments to assist only those in 
greatest need and by increasing reliance on private sector production.  In the 1990s, the federal government 
concentrated on improving the efficiency of the administration for existing housing units (FCM 2000).  In 
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sum, this period saw a shift away from relatively deep levels of financial support, followed by increased 
reliance on the private sector and public-private partnerships for housing production (Sheridan et al 2002).  
The current housing policies of the federal and Ontario provincial governments “rely on market-generated 
solutions to housing problems” (Skaburskis and Mok 2000, 171). 
 
Current Issues in Housing Policy 
 Since the senior governments withdrew support for housing in the mid-1990s, the municipal 
governments have, by necessity, taken a leadership role in the housing crisis.  While there are some senior 
government programs and funds remaining, the assistance is minimal and program eligibility criteria are 
specific.  There is no money available for ongoing expenses in current senior government programs - only 
capital costs are eligible (Carter 1997).  Further, assistance from the federal government has narrowed 
considerably from wide reaching support of low-income households to programs targeted only at specific 
groups (Carter 1997).  For example, federal programs such as Home Adaptations for Seniors Independence, 
the Shelter Enhancement Program for victims of family violence, and the Remote On-Reserve Housing 
Initiative are all designed to assist specific groups.  Other programs are specific about how funding can be 
spent, with an emphasis on repair of existing buildings.  This is probably because total senior government 
funding commitments are too low to assist in new construction.  Funding is available from the federal 
government through the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program (RRAP), which assists in mandatory 
repairs and the conversion of unoccupied buildings to residential use, and through the similar Emergency 
Repair Program.  The RRAP program has been criticized as primarily funding small patch up and repair jobs 
but this is not entirely true.  Project Amik, which is profiled in Part 3 of this report, received almost $1 million 
in assistance through this program for the conversion of an abandoned warehouse to contain residential 
units, two administration offices, and a daycare.  In terms of existing rental unit repairs, the average cost of 
repairs funded by RRAP Rental program (per unit) was $12,882 between 1998 and 1999 (CMHC undated).  
Peter Robinson (2003), project manager of the Peterborough Community Housing Development Corporation, 
notes that while “the RRAP program is popular and arguably quite successful, the problem is that there isn’t 
enough funding to go around.” 
 Other federal programs have been launched in recent years, such as the Supporting Communities 
Partnership Initiative (SCPI) and the Canadian Centre for Public-Private Partnerships in Housing (CCPPPH).  
The SCPI program is criticized for focusing primarily on capacity building and continuing support services 
rather than capital investments in housing production (FCM 2000), and that the resources allocated through 
SCPI are minimal.  SCPI funding is distributed at the municipal level according to terms and conditions 
outlined by the federal government.  Many municipalities have had difficulty administering the SCPI money 
because its use was limited to a three year period, although the period has been extended (Commissioner 
2002a).  The CCPPPH program established within CMHC is mandated to promote “the development of 
affordable housing that does not require ongoing government subsidies to operate” (Pomeroy et al 1998, 31 
emphasis not added).  However, with the exception of proposal development loans and mortgage insurance 
loans, it appears that the CCPPPH program is limited to project planning advice and networking assistance 
(CMHC 1998).  When this program is compared with municipal partnership programs such as Let’s Build 
and ActionOttawa, it is evident that the municipalities are taking a more results-oriented approach. 
 Municipal leadership in housing has brought a notable departure from the strategies of previous 
housing policies and programs, which is the effort to reduce the underlying costs of housing production.  
Costs can be reduced by allocating surplus municipal lands to affordable housing projects, reducing parking 
requirements, encouraging development of single-room occupancy units, waiving development charges, and 
streamlining the approval process.  This strategy has been essential, given that municipal budgets are 
insufficient to fulfill the responsibility of housing provision.  While it is agreed that municipalities are the 
appropriate level of government to administer affordable housing programs because they are well placed to 
understand local need (Sewell 1994), there must be more funding support from senior levels of government.  
According to Carter and McAfee (1990, 227) “municipalities, even with the best of goodwill and motivations, 
cannot be expected to fulfill all of the roles and responsibilities required to respond to housing need.”  This is 
because the property tax, which is a municipality's main source of revenue, is an inadequate and 
inappropriate source of funding to serve a redistributive purpose such as the provision of low-cost housing 
(City of Toronto 1999).  In this regard, Carter and McAfee (1990, 239) argue that “local taxes should not and 
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cannot be used to effect income redistribution” and that “fiscal responsibility for housing must remain a 
priority of the senior levels of government because of the broader tax base they command.”   
 In sum, although municipalities are provincially required to provide a full range of housing, the tools 
to do so have not been supplied.  While some municipalities have been successful in producing new 
housing through creative partnerships and cost reduction, the affordability crisis in Canadian cities will not 
be solved without increased senior government funding.  Recent announcements of plans for increased 
federal spending on housing indicate that financial support may be restored to some degree.  In the 
meantime, the development of strategies to produce new housing without increased senior government 
support should be treated with a sense of urgency. 
 
2.3 Comparative Discussion of the Partnership Strategy 
 Analysis of public-private partnerships as a strategy to address the urban affordability crisis reveals 
several advantages over alternative methods.  First, partnerships offer a flexible approach that can be tailored 
to the specific needs of a given municipality and can be adapted to its regulatory framework.  If the 
municipal incentives are strong enough, effective negotiation with private sector partners can produce public 
benefits that are highly valued by the community.   
 Second, the partnership strategy is politically neutral compared to other strategies and is favoured 
by the private sector over government intervention.  The development industry prefers voluntary initiatives like 
partnership programs over the imposition of mandatory inclusion requirements (CMHC 1999; Greene 1991).  
Inclusionary zoning, whereby a minimum percentage of units in a new residential development must be sold 
or rented at affordable rates, is an example of regulation-based methods for increasing the supply of 
affordable housing.  Greene (1991) reports that developers find that inclusionary zoning adds to uncertainty 
and reduces profit, which threatens project feasibility.  According to interviews with for-profit private sector 
developers conducted by Greene (1991, 106), “developers feel that the solution [to shortfalls in the 
production of affordable housing] is in providing incentives, not regulat ions.”  Staff at the City of Toronto’s 
Let’s Build partnership program also believe that providing incentives is more effective than government 
intervention when trying to secure private sector investment in low-cost rental housing (Wood 2003).  
Politically, the partnership strategy is appealing among the voting public because the involvement of the 
private sector in the development of low-cost housing reduces reliance on public funds.  Also, the public 
costs of an affordable housing partnership are often in the form of long term leases on surplus municipal land 
or forgone taxes and fees, which are less visible to the public than direct expenditure of collected funds. 
 Finally, in the context of senior government funding shortfalls and the economic constraints to 
private sector rental development, the partnership strategy is a realistic way to bridge the gap between 
insufficient public resources and the costs of housing development.  In practice, partnerships have helped to 
combine public and private sector tools as part of an integrated housing strategy.  Partnerships enable 
municipalities to utilize private sector resources, expertise, and efficiency, which can result in reduced 
project development costs.  By levering contributions from a variety of partners, the partnership strategy 
reduces the cost borne by each partner and improves project viability. 
 An additional benefit of the partnership strategy has been observed through site tours of the two 
housing developments which are profiled in the next section of this paper.  This benefit is impossible to 
quantify, but because involvement in partnership programs is voluntary, there is a sense that the housing 
has been produced out of a desire to help rather than mere adherence to minimum inclusion requirements.  
This gives the buildings a personal quality that might not exist if they had been developed under different 
circumstances.  The cooperation and shared responsibility among partners in the planning and financing of 
these housing developments may take hold in the relationships that form among neighbours.  The art gallery 
in Project Amik and the community garden, kitchen, and children’s play area in Trellis Gardens, which are 
described in Part Three, may provide a setting for this sense of cooperation and shared responsibility to 
grow. 
 
 A limitation of the partnership strategy is that the specific financing arrangements are not replicable 
from one jurisdiction to another, and are not necessarily replicable from project to project within one program 
(Suchman and Sowell 1997).  Due to the high degree of variability in application, there has been little 
systematic analysis of the effectiveness of partnership programs in the literature (Canadian Housing and 
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Renewal Association 1991).  The fact that there is no standard formula for structuring a partnership may add 
to administrative costs and the time required for project planning.  According to Farris (2001, 22) “some 
developments require multiple layers of financing from different public and private sources, with different 
goals and schedules for each.  It may take years to successfully package the appropriate financing for a 
project.”  However, once a municipal partnership program has been established, its staff will develop 
knowledge of what works best based on the resources that are available and the rules of the regulatory 
framework.  Execution of the process will improve with experience, as has been demonstrated by the Let’s 
Build program.  Knowledge of a wide variety of community-based, private sector, and government resources 
has been compiled by Let’s Build staff, which can be applied to future projects.  Also, although the exact 
financing arrangements may not be replicable, partnership programs can be modeled after existing programs 
if the regulatory framework, senior government resources, and housing demand issues are the same.  The 
example given in the Part Three is that the City of Ottawa’s ActionOttawa partnership initiative has been 
modeled after the Let’s Build program. 
 Other methods for increasing the supply of affordable housing, such as direct government provision 
and inclusionary zoning may be more straight forward in application, but a definite shift toward partnerships 
has been observed in Canada and the United States.  Direct government provision of housing is simply not 
possible due to inadequate support from senior governments and fiscal constraints at the local level.  In the 
future, it is expected that attention will continue to be directed toward strategies that are “relatively 
inexpensive for municipalities to implement and that rely on the private sector” (Tomalty et al c.1999, 69).  
Inclusionary zoning is very inexpensive for municipalities to implement, but it presents other challenges.  
Although inclusionary zoning has proven to be highly effective in California, New Jersey, and Maryland 
(White 1992), locally conducted research has concluded that “a negotiated approach to inclusionary 
housing, involving incentives, would be more practical in the Toronto business climate than a mandatory 
inclusionary zoning program” (Tomalty et al c.1999, 14).  Greene (1991) reports that legislative barriers, the 
likelihood of challenges at the Ontario Municipal Board, and the need for provincial enabling legislation have 
prevented the use of inclusionary zoning policies in Toronto.  These factors, combined with strong opposition 
from the development industry and fears that inclusionary requirements would result in higher housing costs 
overall have contributed to a demonstrated preference of the partnership strategy.  Part Three explores 
application of the partnership strategy in greater detail with a focus on the City of Toronto’s Let’s Build 
program. 
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Part Three: The “Let’s Build” Partnership Program for Affordable 
Housing 
 
 As discussed in the previous section, Canadian municipalities are now engaging in partnership 
agreements with the private sector in order to overcome the financial challenges which are preventing 
affordable rental housing production.  This section provides an overview of what the City of Toronto is doing 
to increase the supply of affordable rental housing through the Let’s Build partnership program.  Project 
Amik and Trellis Gardens are profiled as case studies and the details of the partnerships are discussed.   
 
3.1 Let’s Build  
 Let’s Build is the City of Toronto’s newest affordable housing development program which runs out 
of the Community and Neighbourhood Services Department.  The objective of the Let’s Build program is to 
encourage construction of new affordable housing in Toronto by working in partnership with the private 
sector.  The program was created as a strategic response to homelessness and the shortage of affordable 
housing for low-income households in the City of Toronto.  Recognizing that there are fewer senior 
government resources available for housing production than in the past due to program cancellations and 
funding cutbacks, the intention of the Let’s Build program is to create new low-cost housing with minimal 
reliance on government subsidies.  A variety of financial incentives are offered by the municipality in order to 
secure private sector involvement in the program.  Generally it is found that the benefits of the partnership 
outweigh the cost of providing the incentives (Wood 2003).  The financial incentives offered may include the 
use of city owned land, grants and interest free loans, waiver of development charges and permit fees, 
streamlining of the approval process, reduced property taxes, waiver of parkland dedication fees, and other 
measures which reduce the underlying costs of development.  By pairing up with private sector partners and 
by utilizing the remaining senior government programs, the Let’s Build program helps the city to increase 
the supply of affordable housing with less reliance on municipal resources than if the city were to finance the 
projects on its own.  The municipality and the private sector partners find that together they are able to 
produce housing at a level of affordability that neither could achieve independently.  When the resources of 
each partner are combined, more money is available upfront which means that mortgage costs can be 
reduced.  Free lease of surplus municipal land and interest free loans reduce costs by eliminating the need 
to pay interest or lease charges.  Exemption from planning fees and development charges, property tax 
reductions, and streamlining of the approval process reduce underlying costs.  Finally, private sector 
developers employ their expertise to reduce development costs through architectural design and the use of 
construction methods which maximize efficiency. 
 
How the Program Works 
 City-owned land used for Let’s Build projects is made available through the city’s new Housing First 
Policy, which holds affordable housing development as a top priority for surplus municipal lands.  The use of 
city-owned land for affordable housing has been a particularly important aspect of the program because it 
has acted as a catalyst for action.  Many of the groups involved in Let’s Build projects have had a long 
history of interest in the issue of affordable housing, but without a specific site to work with they could not 
begin the process of proposal development.  When the city begins forming partnerships with for-profit 
developers in the spring of 2003, it is anticipated that the use of municipal land will be a very strong incentive 
(Wood 2003).  
 Financial assistance in the form of loans and grants for Let’s Build projects comes from the Capital 
Revolving Fund for Affordable Housing (CRF).  The CRF is a $25 million fund which was set up by the city in 
1999 as a way to provide financial assistance to eligible affordable housing developers.  Assistance provided 
to each project through the CRF is limited to a maximum of 25 percent of total capital costs although, the 
projects approved to date have required CRF funding for only 18 percent of total capital costs (Commissioner 
2002a).  This shows that Let’s Build staff have selected efficient, competitive proposals for the projects 
approved to date.  An external advisory group consisting of members from Toronto Council, the development 
and property management industry, the financial sector, the community-based housing and services sector, 
and the federal and provincial governments advises staff on the use and allocation of the CRF funds (City of 
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Toronto 2002d).  To date, 68 percent of the allocations from the Capital Revolving Fund have been in the form 
of loans and 32 percent have been in the form of grants (Commissioner 2002a).  According to the 2002 
annual progress report on Let’s Build, the CRF is not expected to be self-sustaining in the short term 
because the loans are long term (35 years), but in the long run repayments to the CRF will “have the 
potential to become a significant source of revenue to support new projects” (Commissioner 2002a, 7). 
 The procedure for project approval requires that the Request for Proposals (RFP) competitive 
process is followed.  RFPs are sent out to a database of private sector companies and organizations that 
has been compiled by Let’s Build staff and are also posted on the city’s website.  All projects receiving 
assistance from the CRF or the use of city owned land must be approved by Toronto Council.  According to 
Zimmerman (2002) Let’s Build projects are not exempt from any part of the approval process, which includes 
development proposals, building permits and other standard requirements, and may also include appeals to 
the committee of adjustment, rezoning applications, or official plan amendments.  However, Let’s Build 
projects are fast-tracked through the development approval system using the new Corporate Priority Policy 
(Let’s Build 2000). 
 Affordability criteria stipulate that rents charged in Let’s Build projects do not exceed a maximum of 
90 percent of the average market rents as measured by the CMHC rental market survey for the City of 
Toronto (Commissioner 2000).  The duration of the affordable rents depend on the negotiated terms of the 
Affordable Housing Agreement between the city and the private sector partner.  The details of the Affordable 
Housing Agreement will likely stipulate that interest charges on loans from the CRF and lease rates on city 
owned land will only be waived if the units are rented at the negotiated rate and to tenants from the approved 
sources.  Tenants for assisted units must be selected from Toronto Social Housing Connections waiting list 
or the emergency shelter system. 
 To date, involvement in the Let’s Build program has been dominated by private sector non-profit 
groups (Zimmerman 2002).  This is because involvement in the Let’s Build program had been limited to non-
profit organizations until recent amendments to the Municipal Act (Section 210.1) enabled municipalities to 
offer financial incentives to for-profit developers.  Prior to this legislative change municipalities could only 
offer financial incentives to non-profit organizations.  The first partnerships with for-profit developers are 
expected to be formed soon because the first RFP extended to for-profit developers will be released in 
March 2003 (Wood 2003).  According to Wood (2003), there has been a high level of informal interest from 
for-profit developers in the private sector because “the city money will open up a new sector for these 
developers ... one in which they will make a profit.”  The low-cost housing market has been underserved for 
the past few decades because the costs of development do not allow for a decent return on investment.  In 
fact, it has been found that for modest rental units, the break-even rents are sometimes higher than average 
market rents (City of Ottawa 2002a; City of Toronto 1999).  Therefore, the introduction of municipal 
incentives for affordable housing development effectively opens a large new market for the private sector.  
From the city’s perspective, the advantages of for-profit private sector involvement are that developers may 
have their own land and money to contribute to new projects and that they have proven expertise in reducing 
the costs of development. 
 While there is great enthusiasm about the expansion of the Let’s Build program to include 
involvement with for-profit developers, it will be important to maintain the involvement of non-profit groups.  
Wood does not anticipate that the involvement of for-profit developers in the Let’s Build program will drive out 
non-profit involvement even though the for-profit developers have more capital resources and expertise.  
Instead, it is expected that non-profits will either partner with the for-profits, or continue to work with the city 
on separate projects.  According to Zimmerman (2002), non-profits are not as skilled at driving down 
development costs but they can help with other challenges, such as working with special needs groups.  
Additionally, they bring strength to a project through the energy and dedication of volunteers.  An important 
benefit of working with non-profit housing providers is that the housing may remain affordable forever, 
whereas the affordability of projects constructed by for-profit developers will likely be limited to the duration 
of the affordable rent terms. 
 The following subsections profile two recently completed Let’s Build affordable housing projects 
which were developed with non-profit partners.  The details of the process, the partnership contributions, and 
photographs of the finished buildings help to give an idea of the amount of planning, coordination of 
resources, and labour that go into each project.  These profiles also provide a specific context for discussing 
the lessons which have been learned through experience. 
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3.2 Project Profile: Project Amik 
 Project Amik, which means “beaver” in 
Ojibwe, is one of the first affordable housing 
projects to be completed under the City of 
Toronto’s Let’s Build program.  It is also the first large 
scale affordable housing development to be 
completed in Ontario since 1993 (Stark 2002).  It 
contains 74 low-cost rental units, which provide 
affordable housing to over 100 people, including 
seniors, singles, and families.  The partners 
involved in Project Amik include Frontiers 
Foundation Incorporated (developer), New 
Frontiers Aboriginal Residential Corporation 
(NFARC, financing assistance), Senior Link 
(property management and support services), and 
the City of Toronto through Let’s Build.  There was also federal and provincial government involvement in the 
project, through various federal programs, rent supplement, and provincial sales tax rebates.  Bringing 
together so many partners and resources from all three levels of government is what allowed Frontiers 
Foundation and Let’s Build to significantly reduce mortgage and development costs and make the project 
possible.  The dedication of Frontiers Foundation and the generosity of its donors and volunteers were also 
critical to the success of Project Amik. 
 Frontiers Foundation is a charitable non-profit organization dedicated to providing housing for 
aboriginal people in need of assistance.  Over two thousand homes have been built by Frontiers Foundation 
in the past 33 years, most of which have been single detached houses in northern Ontario and other parts of 
Canada (Catto 2003).  Within Project Amik, half of the units were made available to aboriginal families, 
singles, and seniors requiring housing assistance and half of the units were filled by applicants on the 
Toronto Social Housing Connections  waiting list.  The official opening ceremony was held on October 17, 
2002 and Project Amik is now 100 percent occupied (Catto 2003).   
 Located at 419-425 Coxwell Avenue in Toronto’s east end, Project Amik includes two three-story 
buildings, each containing a mix of one, two, and three bedroom apartments.  Fourteen of the units are 
specially designed to accommodate the needs of physically challenged individuals.  The larger of the two 
buildings, containing 44 of the 74 units, is a converted Eaton’s warehouse and garment factory, while the 
second building is entirely new construction built upon formerly vacant land.  The site also includes surface 
and underground parking, an aboriginal art gallery, and the Le Petit Chaperon Rouge Day Care facility, both 
of which are housed within the converted building.  Rents for the apartments are approximately $500 for a 
one bedroom unit and $600 for a two bedroom unit.  The total cost of developing this project was 
$10,500,000 (Stark 2002).  With the exception of rent supplements funded by the provincial government, it 
will not receive ongoing operating subsidies. 
 Project Amik was initiated when the city put forth a request for proposals for the development of 
affordable housing on the site and the Frontiers Foundation proposal was chosen over a number of other 
proposals.  Let’s Build staff recommended the project to Council for approval, including free long term lease 
of the land and partial mortgage funding from the CRF (Wood 2003).  Let’s Build staff were successful in 
coordinating funds from a wide variety of federal programs for use in this project, including close to $1 million 
under the RRAP program for conversion of the industrial building to residential use.  The municipal resources 
provided through Let’s Build have been critical for levering funds from other sources.  According to the 2002 
annual report on the progress of Let’s Build, “without Let’s Build core resources and co-ordination, none of 
the other leveraged resources would have come into play” (Commissioner 2002a, 6).  Table 1 provides a 
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Table 1: Project Amik Partnership Contributions Summary 
New Frontiers Aboriginal 
Residential Corporation
(Source: Stark 2002)
• holds the first private mortgage of over $6 million
• paid the mortgage insurance required by Canada Life of over 
$300,000
• provision of support services to residents
• provision of training for an Aboriginal support staff
Senior Link
(Source: Catto 2003)
• CMHC’s Canadian Centre for Public-Private Partnerships in Housing  
(CCPPPH) provided an interest-free repayable proposal development 
loan of $75,000 to help Frontiers Foundation Inc. with upfront 
development expenses
• Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program  provided funding in the 
amount of $942,000 to convert the former industrial building into 44 
housing units, and to ensure accessibility for persons with disabilities 
($150,000 under RRAP for Persons with Disabilities  and $792,000 
under RRAP for Non-Residential Conversion )
• CMHC mortgage loan insurance helped Frontiers Foundation to 
obtain a loan of over $6 million to cover the remaining expenses of 
conversion of the existing building and construction of the new 30-
unit apartment building
• National Homelessness Initiative  (NHI) provided $46,928 in funding 
from the Supporting Communities Partnership Initiative  (SCPI) to 
provide outreach services
• HRDC Apprenticeship Training : $84,000
Partner Project Amik Partnership Contributions Summary
• PST rebates for building materials (valued at $148,000)
• Homelessness Rent Supplement Program  will be providing RGI 






• raised $500,000 through private donations and fundraising plus 
donated materials
• coordinated apprentices and volunteer labourers during project 
construction




• provided $1,570,000 in land (leased to NFARC for $1 for a period of 50 
years)
• provided a $888,000 grant from Toronto's Capital Revolving Fund for 
construction
• provided a $91,000 loan to pay for the Toronto Catholic District 
School Board development charge 
• waived fees and development charges valued at $166,000
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3.3 Project Profile: Trellis Gardens 
 Trellis Gardens is also one of the first Let’s 
Build affordable housing developments.  
Although it was not the first to be completed and 
occupied, it was the first project initiated in the Let’s 
Build program.  The name “Trellis” was chosen 
because it is a symbol of support for beauty, 
growth, and development (Hyman 2003).  Trellis 
Gardens is a three-story building which 
contains 24 rental units, including 17 rent 
supplement units which provide low-cost 
housing to households who were previously living 
in the city’s emergency shelter system and 
motels.  Most of these units are occupied by single 
women and their children.  The remaining seven units 
are rented at average market rent, which is $1,079 for a two bedroom apartment and $1,289 for a three 
bedroom apartment.  Rents for the assisted units are set at the shelter component of social assistance, 
with the remainder paid by rent supplements.  The total cost of developing this project was $3,923,000 
(Hyman 2003).  It will not receive ongoing operating subsidies. 
 Located at 651 Lawrence Avenue West, Trellis Gardens has a mix of one, two, and three bedroom 
apartments.  The apartments are bright and spacious, with high quality kitchen fixtures and new appliances.  
There is no differentiation in quality or apartment size between the market-rate and assisted units.  On the 
main floor of the building there is a child care room and a communal kitchen with a large dining room.  The 
site includes space for a community garden and children’s playground equipment, which is scheduled for 
completion in the summer of 2003.  When construction of the building’s common areas is complete and the 
building is fully occupied, support services such as child care and skills training will be offered to residents 
who wish to participate.  The proposal for Trellis Gardens contained a strong component of community 
programming and numerous volunteers have signed up to lead cooking classes, parent support seminars, 
and art programs (Hyman 2003). 
 The partners involved in this project include Trellis Housing Initiatives Incorporated, the City of 
Toronto through Let’s Build, and the federal and provincial governments through various funding and loan 
programs.  Table 2 provides a summary of the contributions made by each partner (see page 28).  Trellis 
Housing Initiatives is a community-based non-profit organization that was formed by members of 
Congregation Darchei Noam and volunteers from the Out of the Cold Resource Centre.  Planning for Trellis 
Gardens began when staff from the City of Toronto approached Out of the Cold representatives who had 
previous experience in housing development.  A joint meeting was held to develop the proposal for Trellis 
Gardens (Hyman 2003). 
 The planning and development process was long and complicated for this project, largely because it 
was the first to go through the system.  In order to proceed with construction, Trellis Housing Initiatives first 
had to enter into a Lease Agreement, an Affordable Housing Agreement, and a Grant and Loan Agreement 
with the city.  However, these legal documents were rewritten six times, which caused delays in obtaining 
funding from other sources (Hyman 2003).  Consequently, the delay in obtaining funds held up construction 
because the builder could not be paid.  Additional expenses were incurred as a result of the delays and 
there are ongoing negotiations about who is responsible for these expenses.  For example, the property 
manager had been hired for the original occupancy date of August 1st, 2002, but occupancy was delayed 
month by month to February 15th 2003.  Residents had been selected in April 2002 and had to continue 
living in temporary accommodations as the move-in date was repeatedly delayed.  The experience was 
frustrating for the residents because of their poor living conditions.  In order to relay updates on the building’s 
progress to the residents, each board member took three names from the list of residents as personal 
contacts.  This gesture is one of many which demonstrate that the Trellis Housing Initiatives volunteers truly 
care about people.  When move-in day finally arrived, the board members helped the residents move in and 
assisted in getting mattresses and other furniture donated (Hyman 2003).  Several weeks later, the board 
members hosted a pizza party to welcome all of the residents and celebrate the completion of the building. 
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 The most remarkable aspect of the Trellis Gardens development is the sense that much more has 
been created than just the building itself.  The people of Trellis Housing Initiatives have worked hard to 
establish a setting which supports community interaction and personal growth.  Although physical settings 
cannot create a sense of community or determine how people will use a space, the community garden, 
shared kitchen and dining areas, and the child care room are important features of the project.  As co-
housing developments have demonstrated, shared kitchens are very useful for single parents because 
neighbours can share cooking responsibilities or supervision of children while others are away at work.  
Additionally, the cooking, parenting, and art programs to be offered by volunteers will present opportunities 
to get involved and develop new skills.  Finally, the dedication which was demonstrated by the board 
members throughout the delayed construction process and on the move-in day sends a message that Trellis 
Gardens was created out of a genuine desire to help.  This is the reason that Let’s Build staff should ensure 
that the involvement of for-profit developers in the program does not drive out non-profits.  While it is true that 
for-profit developers may have a desire to help, it is also true that the municipal incentives will enable them 
to make a profit in a sector of the real estate market in which it was previously impossible to do so.  It is 
anticipated that the potential for profit will be their main motivation for involvement in Let’s Build partnerships 
(Wood 2003).  Therefore, while the Let’s Build program stands to benefit from for-profit involvement because 
of their resources and expertise in cost reduction, the staff at Let’s Build should also recognize the value of 
non-profit involvement and strive to keep them involved. 
 Reflecting on the experience, Hyman has noted that “if you really want to set up these public-private 
partnerships, you have to make it easier for the private partners... I sometimes feel that for all we’ve been 
through, we could have built 240 units of housing instead of 24” (Keenan 2002, 4).  According to Hyman, 
“the Let’s Build staff were wonderful,” but being the first project to go through the system was a frustrating 
experience (2003).  Mark Guslits, Special Advisor for the Let’s Build team acknowledges that there have 
been growing pains but reports that the process is speeding up (Keenan 2002).  Guslits also notes that with 
public money there is always going to be more bureaucracy, which may be a new experience for the private 
sector partners (Keenan 2002).  With three completed projects and six other projects in various stages of 
development, it appears that the program has improved with experience. 
 Table 2 provides a summary of the contributions made by each partner. 
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Table 2: Trellis Gardens Partnership Contributions Summary   
• CMHC provided $87,000 in grants and loans (interest free) for proposal 
development
• CMHC mortgage loan insurance: $1.9 million (helped to facilitate 
construction by enabling a larger mortgage to be obtained at a lower rate)
• National Homelessness Initiative  (NHI) provided $500,000 in capital funding 
from the Supporting Communities Partnership Initiative  (SCPI) 
• HomeGrown grant of $20,000
• Affordability and Choice Today (ACT) grant of $12,000
Partner Trellis Gardens Partnership Contributions Summary
• no direct contribution to capital costs
• Homelessness Rent Supplement Program  will be providing rent supplements 
of an undisclosed amount
Federal 
Government




(Source: City of 
Toronto 2001b)
• raised $360,000 through private donations and fundraising
• acquired donated mattresses and other furniture





• provided land valued at $500,000 (lease rates waived for a period of 50 years 
if the rent targets set out in the Affordable Housing Agreement are 
maintained)
• provided a $288,000 grant from Toronto's Capital Revolving Fund
• provided a $800,000 loan (interest free) to cover the second mortgage
• waived fees and development charges valued at $100,000
The City of 
Toronto - 
Let’s Build




3.4 Accomplishments and Lessons Learned 
 There are now nine Let’s Build projects (418 units) with Council-approved funding in various stages 
of development in all areas of the city (Commissioner 2002a).  Completed developments include Project 
Amik, Trellis Gardens, St. Paul L’Amoureaux, and Shaw House in addition to some small scale renovation 
projects (Wood 2003).  Table 3 provides a summary of the nine projects with approved funding on page 30.  
When these nine Let’s Build projects are combined with the federal SCPI (Supporting Communities 
Partnership Initiative) transitional housing funds delivered by the city (which is also a responsibility of Let’s 
Build staff), more than 900 housing units have received some form of assistance since 2000 (City of Toronto 
2002c).  Although this paper focuses on permanent affordable housing projects rather than transitional 
housing, it is important to note that having the Let’s Build framework in place and staff expertise in 
coordinating funding and project planning has helped the City of Toronto to be more successful than other 
municipalities in expediting delivery of time-limited SCPI funds (Commissioner 2002a).  
 In evaluating the success of the Let’s Build program, a key strength appears to be the 
demonstrated ability to lever additional contributions.  In fact, it has been reported that “every city dollar has 
attracted three dollars from other sources” (Wood 2003).  Certainly the partnership strategy has proven to be 
more cost-effective than if the municipality were to undertake the housing projects independently.  However, 
a breakdown of contributions reveals that the federal and provincial governments are not contributing enough.  
In some cases, the fundraising efforts and voluntarism of the non-profit organizations have matched or 
exceeded senior government contributions.  Calculations based on six Let’s Build projects in advanced 
stages of construction reveal that city contributions accounted for 26 percent of total capital costs (including 
land, loans, grants, and fee and charge exemptions), averaging $39,000 per unit (Commissioner 2002a).  
Federal contributions accounted for 11 percent, provincial contributions were 2 percent (plus rent 
supplements), and the non-profit sponsor groups raised 10 percent.  The remaining 51 percent of total 
capital costs for these projects were financed through mortgages.  Given the severity of Toronto’s affordable 
housing shortage and the fact that senior government support is minimal, staff at Let’s Build have a realistic 
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attitude when evaluating the success of the program.  According to Wood (2003), a development is 
considered to be successful if it gets built and if the rents will remain affordable for the long term. 
 As the experience of Trellis Housing Initiatives has demonstrated, implementation of the Let’s Build 
program has followed a learning process.  Subsequent projects have not encountered the same degree of 
bureaucratic red tape and delays as Trellis Gardens.  In the relatively short time frame of three years, Let’s 
Build has managed to get nine projects totaling 418 units underway after a long period of time in which no 
new affordable housing was built at all.  As further evidence of its success, the Let’s Build program has 
served as a model for the City of Ottawa’s pilot partnership program, “ActionOttawa.”  It makes sense for 
Ottawa to use the Let’s Build program as a model because the regulatory framework governing municipal 
undertakings and the resources available through senior government funding programs are the same in both 
cities.  Partnership programs used in the United States or other provinces would not be as readily 
transferable.  Additionally, the shortage of affordable housing in Ottawa is comparable to the situation in 
Toronto (City of Ottawa 2002a).   
 ActionOttawa uses a similar combination of capital grant dollars, loans, waiver of fees and parkland 
levies, and surplus municipal land to attract private sector involvement.  The goal of the program is to build 
250 new units per year to serve applicants on the city’s social housing waiting list (City of Ottawa 2002b).  
The program is specifically targeting one bedroom and three bedroom units as well as units with special 
needs accessibility.  One notable difference between the two programs is that Ottawa’s affordability criteria 
only require 60 percent of the units to be rented at below average market rents.  However, both programs 
permit affordable developments to be combined with market developments to increase project viability. 
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Table 3: Summary of Completed and Current Let’s Build Projects 
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The Outlook for the Future 
 Through this research several strategies for improvement of the Let’s Build program have been 
identified.  However, each of these strategies require an increase in senior government support for affordable 
housing.  First are foremost, the financial contributions of the federal and provincial governments must be 
increased.  It is appalling that in some cases, volunteers and private donors are doing as much or more than 
the senior governments to resolve the affordable housing crisis in the City of Toronto.  Such generosity and 
dedication is admirable, but housing provision is a government responsibility which should not depend so 
heavily on the fundraising efforts of charitable organizations and volunteers.  This is clear when one 
considers that the senior governments have recently delivered tax cuts to middle- and upper- income 
taxpayers and corporations.  To clarify, the reason that the provision of low-cost housing is a government 
responsibility is because it is an example of market failure.  The market cannot produce housing that is 
affordable to households in the lowest income range without some form of government subsidy.   
 The breakdown of Let’s Build project contributions also reveals that the City of Toronto is spending 
more than the federal and provincial governments.  As discussed earlier in this paper, property taxes, which 
are the main source of revenue for the municipal contributions to Let’s Build projects, are an inappropriate 
and inadequate source of funds for housing provision.  This is partly because of the regional economic 
disparity discussed in Part One of this paper.  Municipalities with greater proportions of low-income 
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households will be unable to raise as much revenue through property taxes, although they will effectively 
need more than richer municipalities in order to respond to stronger demand for assisted housing.  Property 
taxes are considered to be an inappropriate source of funding for housing because people who are in need of 
assistance will move from place to place in search of better opportunities.  Imbalances in demand for low-
cost housing develop over time, as is evident in the greater incidence of low-income that has been observed 
in the City of Toronto when compared with other municipalities in the GTA region.  Property taxes are 
considered to be an inadequate source of funding for housing because the potential for revenue collection 
does not match the scope or severity of the problem.  The shortage of affordable housing in Canadian 
municipalities has recently been called a national disaster by numerous mayors and the Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities.  It is clearly time for the senior governments to follow the lead of the municipalities 
and private sector non-profits and contribute their fair share for affordable housing projects.  In recent months 
there have been announcements of plans for increased federal spending on housing, but whether the funding 
will materialize is questionable.  If the recently announced federal Affordable Housing Partnership Program 
does lead to a more equitable sharing of contributions between the federal and municipal levels of 
government, and current municipal funding levels are maintained, it is expected that a larger volume of units 
could be produced in the future.  In terms of provincial contributions, the city is lobbying for more rent 
supplement funding so that the number of new rent supplement units created in the city can be increased.  
At present, only 40 percent of the rent supplement funding allocated for Toronto (1,841 units in total) can be 
used in new Let’s Build and SCPI units, with the remaining 60 percent to be used in existing units.  Rent 
supplements are important because they deepen the level of affordability in Let’s Build projects and they can 
help to reduce the costs of development.  This is because rent supplements are recognized by the lender as 
part of the project’s revenue stream, which can result in reduced mortgage costs. 
 As a final comment, the senior governments need to acknowledge that affordable housing 
developments trigger economic benefits that extend beyond the site and its inhabitants.  Project Amik has 
created 80 jobs in construction trades, 7 full time jobs in administration, plus related jobs created by 
demand for raw building materials and prefabricated components such as doors and plumbing fixtures, as 
well as transportation, installation, and inspection services (Stark 2002).  Senior governments also draw 
revenue from affordable housing projects.  According to Catto (2003), approximately $1.3 million has been 
paid in federal taxes associated with Project Amik and $185,000 has been paid in provincial taxes.  These 
taxes should be waived for all eligible housing projects meeting defined affordability standards, as has been 
demonstrated by the waiver of municipal fees and charges.  Discussion of these issues is continued in Part 
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Part Four: Concluding Discussion 
 
4.1 Concluding Discussion 
 To restate the problem that motivated this research, there is a severe shortage of affordable housing 
in the City of Toronto, but the majority of new residential development is being produced for the high end and 
ownership markets.  Analysis of infill development trends and the supply and demand figures for affordable 
housing confirm that affordable residential infill is acutely needed in the City of Toronto.  The significance of 
this problem is that while infill has the potential to increase the supply of affordable housing in the City of 
Toronto, at present this potential is not being realized.  If infill and intensification policies are to effect a more 
equitable balance in the housing stock which meets the needs of all Toronto residents, the inclusion of 
affordable housing must become a stated priority in these policies. 
 In evaluating possible responses to the shortage of affordable housing, it has been determined that 
neither the municipality nor the private sector can resolve the problem independently.  Municipalities simply 
don’t have enough money and the private sector cannot produce low-cost rental housing without some form 
of financial assistance.  The contextual factors of the problem, including the cancellation of senior 
government housing programs, budgetary constraints at the local level, and poor economics for rental 
development call for strategic collaborative solutions that minimize reliance on public resources.  In this 
regard, partnerships have emerged as the most practical way to bridge the gap between the resources that 
are available and the costs of housing development.  In both Canada and the United States, partnerships 
appear to be the preferred strategy for affordable housing development. 
 In Toronto, public-private partnerships have been successful in getting new low-cost rental housing 
built.  This is a significant accomplishment because prior to the launch of Let’s Build, almost nothing had 
been built since the mid 1990s.  The program has been successful in levering contributions from a variety of 
partners, including the federal and provincial levels of government and community-based non-profit 
organizations of the private sector.  Dispersal of costs is important because no one group has sufficient 
resources to undertake the projects alone.  It is expected that expansion of the Let’s Build program to 
include for-profit developers in March 2003 will result in a substantial increase in the number of units 
produced.  This is because for-profit developers will likely have more money and land to contribute than the 
non-profit partners involved in the program to date, plus their expertise will help them to move through the 
process faster.   
 Reduction of overall development costs is another advantage of the partnership strategy.  It has 
been found that overall development costs can be reduced because of the combined resources that become 
available in a partnership.  To start, mortgage costs can be reduced when there is more money available 
upfront.  Free lease of city owned land and interest free loans eliminate the need to pay interest or lease 
charges.  Exemption from planning fees and development charges, property tax reductions, and a faster 
approval process reduce underlying costs.  Finally, private sector partners employ their expertise to reduce 
development costs through architectural design and the use of construction methods which maximize 
efficiency. 
 While cost reduction and efficiency are goals of the Let’s Build program which have been met with 
success, at this point the priorities are to get new units built and to ensure that they will remain affordable 
for the long term.  Using these criteria, the Let’s Build program can definitely be called successful.  Further 
research of the partnership strategy and partnership programs in other jurisdictions is needed to identify 
additional cost reduction techniques that can be applied to future projects. 
 Consideration of the context in which the partnership strategy has emerged and possible directions 
for the future suggests that the greatest potential for improvement of the Let’s Build program depends on 
increased support from the federal and provincial governments.  In the past, senior government housing 
policies were either flawed in excessive reliance on the private sector to produce low-cost housing without 
assistance or incentives or were flawed due to poorly targeted and inefficient programs.  The sliding scale of 
support in the history of Canadian housing policy is evidence of the many failed attempts to get it right.  
However, to simply withdraw support and download responsibility for housing to the municipal governments 
is not an appropriate response.  Right now, the partnership programs which have been established in some 
Canadian municipalities present a valuable opportunity for senior governments to put the necessary funding 
back into housing provision, in such a way that it will be used effectively and efficiently toward resolving the 
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severe shortages of affordable housing in Canadian municipalities.  Completed Let’s Build projects are 
evidence that the partnership strategy works.  It is now time for the senior governments to give municipal 
partnership programs the funding support that is required. 
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